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INTRODUCTORY NOTE TO THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1874
BY DANIEL H. JOYNER*
[June 12, 2009]
+Cite as 48 ILM 1174 (2009)+
Introduction
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 was adopted on June 12, 2009 in response to the nuclear
weapon test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of North Korea (DPRK or North Korea) on May 25,
2009.1 This was the second nuclear weapon test conducted by the DPRK, its first occurring on October 9, 2006.
The Security Council responded to the first nuclear test by adopting Resolution 1718 on October 14, 2006.2
Resolution 1874 essentially reiterates the Security Council's condemnatory position on North Korea's nuclear
tests, and further extends and supplements sanctions imposed in Resolution 1718.
Overview
Resolution 1874 represents the latest in a long line of Security Council resolutions focused on the problem
of North Korea's nuclear weapons program. 3 Longstanding international concern about the program had been
aggravated by three principal events: North Korea's announcement on January 10, 2003 that it would withdraw
from the 1968 Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT)4 and two nuclear weapon tests that took place in 2006 and
2009 respectively.
Resolution 1874 must be understood within the context of North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, and its
public display of its nuclear arsenal through the tests. North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT was significant
on a number of levels. It represented the first and only time a state withdrew its membership from the treaty,
which is the cornerstone legal instrument in the nuclear non-proliferation normative regime. It also effectively
removed any obligation on the part of North Korea with respect to conventional or customary international law
that prohibits the development, possession, or proliferation of nuclear weapons.
In Resolution 1874, acting under its Chapter VII authority, the Security Council first condemned "in the
strongest terms" the May 25, 2009 nuclear test, demanding that the DPRK not conduct any further tests, or launch
any ballistic missile technology. These injunctions are clearly aimed at reiterating the prohibitions placed upon
the DPRK by Resolution 1718, and at addressing the immediate problem of the nuclear weapons program. The
Security Council then, however, focused on the more fundamental legal problem relating to the DPRK's nuclear
weapons program - the current absence of international law prohibiting the DPRK from developing, possessing
and producing nuclear weapons. In operative paragraphs five and six, the Security Council demanded that North
Korea retract its statement of withdrawal from the NPT and "return at an early date to the NPT and International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards."
This demand by the Security Council is singular. First made in Resolution 1718, and later reiterated in
Resolution 1874, it is the only example to the author's knowledge, where the Security Council asked a state to
re-accede to a treaty from which that state had duly withdrawn according to the treaty's terms. Arguably, this
request seems to cut to the heart of the principle of state sovereignty and the consensual foundations of the sources
of international law. It also raises profound questions about the scope and limits of the authority of the Security
Council, a subject on which the author has written more fully elsewhere. 
5
Following its demand that the DPRK rejoin the NPT, the Security Council proceeded to decide - thus using
its most binding and determinative language - that the DPRK abandon its nuclear weapons and related development
program, and submit itself to the terms of the IAEA safeguards agreement. The DPRK concluded a safeguards
agreement with the IAEA on January 30, 1992. However, pursuant to Article 26, the agreement was to remain in
force only as long as DPRK continued to be a party to the NPIT.6 Thus, the DPRK's withdrawal from the NPT
simultaneously worked as a withdrawal from its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.7 Operative paragraph eight
of Resolution 1874 thus purports to reverse North Korea's withdrawal from both the NPT and the IAEA safeguards
agreement, by commanding the state to abide by one of the central obligations of the NPT (the obligation of Non-
nuclear Weapon States not to develop or possess nuclear weapons) and the termns of its IAEA safeguards agreement.
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One could argue that this decision raises similar issues about the scope and limits of Security Council authority
as the demand that the DPRK rejoin the NPT. In addition, in seemingly inconsistent manner, the Security Council
appears to be requiring that a particular state discontinue, possibly in perpetuam, the development and possession
of the same weapon technologies which at least eight other states - five of whom have permanent seats on the
Council itself - are known to possess.
With respect to the effectiveness of Resolution 1874, it may be useful to consider it along with other Security
Council resolutions relative to the DPRK's nuclear weapons program, as well as Security Council's resolutions
on Iran's nuclear program. These instruments present significant jurisprudential and legitimacy questions, including
those raised herein, which are likely to undermine the effectiveness of those resolutions in influencing state
behavior. 8
On a more practical level, one could argue that the Security Council repeatedly makes demands and takes
decisions regarding both states that it simply does not have the ability to enforce. This inability is due to many
factors including, among others, the unwillingness of the defiant states' leaders and the political and security
limitations of member states responsible for carrying out Security Council commands. This exaggeration of the
Security Council authority, along with the continuing defiance by both states of the Security Council's orders as
expressed through its resolutions, has led to a diminishing of the perceived credibility and effectiveness of the
Security Council in the area of weapons of mass destruction and proliferation.
ENDNOTES
1 S.C. Res. 1874, U.N. Doc. SIRES/1874 (June 12,2009), avail-
able at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/n-korea/nu-
clear/unsc-resolution 1 874.pdf.
2 S.C. Res. 1718, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14,2006), avail-
able at http://www.mofa.go.jp/POLICY/un/resolutionl7l8.pdf.
3 See, e.g., S.C. Res. 825, U.N. Doc. S/RES1825 (May 11, 1993),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/Gaiko/naruhodo/
datalpdf/data3-1.pdf; S.C. Res. 1695, U.N. Doc. S/RES11695
(July 15, 2006), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/
UN/disarmament/n-korea/resolutionl 695.pdf; S.C. Res. 1718,
supra note 3.
4 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 8
1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161.
5 See DANIEL H. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PRO-
LIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION (2009). See
also DAVID SCHWEIGMAN, THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE U.N. CHARTER (2001).
6 Article 26 of the DPRK' s safeguards agreement provides,
"This Agreement shall remain in force as long as the Demo-
cratic People's Republic of Korea is party to the Treaty [the
N1.fl-
7 See Frederic Kirgis, North Korea's Withdrawal from the Nu-
clear Nonproliferation Treaty, AsIL INSIGHTS, Jan. 2003,
http://www.asil.org/insigh96.cfm.
See Joyner, supra note 3; YAEL RONEN, THE IRAN NUCLEAR
ISSUE (2009).
20091 175
UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1874 ON NON-PROLIFERATION*
[June 12, 2009]
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United Nations S IRES/1874 (2009)*
Securty ConcilDistr.: GeneralSecurty Concil12 June 2009
Resolution 1874 (2009)
Adopted by the Security Council at its 6141st meeting, on 12 June 2009
The Security Council,
Recalling its previous relevant resolutions, including resolution 825 (1993), resolution 1540 (2004), resolution
1695 (2006), and, in particular, resolution 1718 (2006), as well as the statements of its President of 6 October
2006 (SIPRST/2006/4 1) and 13 April 2009 (SIPRST/2009/7),
Reaffirming that proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery,
constitutes a threat to international peace and security,
Expressing the gravest concern at the nuclear test conducted by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea
("the DPRK") on 25 May 2009 (local time) in violation of resolution 1718 (2006), and at the challenge such a
test constitutes to the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons ("the NPT") and to international efforts
aimed at strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons towards the 2010 NPT Review
Conference, and the danger it poses to peace and stability in the region and beyond,
Stressing its collective support for the NPT and commitment to strengthen the Treaty in all its aspects, and
global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament, and recalling that the DPRK cannot
have the status of a nuclear-weapon state in accordance with the NPT in any case,
Deploring the DPRK' s announcement of withdrawal from the NPT and its pursuit of nuclear weapons,
Underlining once again the importance that the DPRK respond to other security and humanitarian concerns
of the international community,
Underlining also that measures imposed by this resolution are not intended to have adverse humanitarian
consequences for the civilian population of the DPRK,
Expressing its gravest concern that the nuclear test and missile activities carried out by the DPRK have further
generated increased tension in the region and beyond, and determining that there continues to exist a clear threat
to international peace and security,
Reaffirming the importance that all Member States uphold the purposes and principles of the Charter of the
United Nations,
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and taking measures under its Article 41,
1. Condemns in the strongest terms the nuclear test conducted by the DPRK on 25 May 2009 (local time) in
violation and flagrant disregard of its relevant resolutions, in particular resolutions 1695 (2006) and 1718 (2006),
and the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
* This text was reproduced and reformatted from the text available at the United Nations Security Council official
website: (visited October 1, 2009) <http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/unsc-resolutions09.htm>.
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2. Demands that the DPRK not conduct any further nuclear test or any launch using ballistic missile technology;
3. Decides that the DPRK shall suspend all activities related to its ballistic missile programme and in this
context re-establish its pre-existing commitments to a moratorium on missile launches;
4. Demands that the DPRK immediately comply fully with its obligations under relevant Security Council
resolutions, in particular resolution 1718 (2006);
5. Demands that the DPRK immediately retract its announcement of withdrawal from the NPT;
6. Demands further that the DPRK return at an early date to the NPT and International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) safeguards, bearing in mind the rights and obligations of States Parties to the NPT, and underlines the
need for all States Parties to the NPT to continue to comply with their Treaty obligations;
7. Calls upon all Member States to implement their obligations pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006), including
with respect to designations made by the Committee established pursuant to resolution 1718 (2006) ("the Commit-
tee") pursuant to the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (S/PRST/2009/7);
8. Decides that the DPRK shall abandon all nuclear weapons and existing nuclear programs in a complete,
verifiable and irreversible manner and immediately cease all related activities, shall act strictly in accordance with
the obligations applicable to parties under the NPT and the terms and conditions of the IAEA Safeguards Agreement
(IAEA INFCIRC/403) and shall provide the IAEA transparency measures extending beyond these requirements,
including such access to individuals, documentation, equipment and facilities as may be required and deemed
necessary by the IAEA;
9. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (b) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and
related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the
provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms or materiel;
10. Decides that the measures in paragraph 8 (a) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also apply to all arms and
related materiel, as well as to financial transactions, technical training, advice, services or assistance related to the
provision, manufacture, maintenance or use of such arms, except for small arms and light weapons and their
related materiel, and calls upon States to exercise vigilance over the direct or indirect supply, sale or transfer to
the DPRK of small arms or light weapons, and further decides that States shall notify the Committee at least five
days prior to selling, supplying or transferring small arms or light weapons to the DPRK;
11. Calls upon all States to inspect, in accordance with their national authorities and legislation, and consistent
with international law, all cargo to and from the DPRK, in their territory, including seaports and airports, if the
State concerned has information that provides reasonable grounds to believe the cargo contains items the supply,
sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 or by paragraph
9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those provisions;
12. Calls upon all Member States to inspect vessels, with the consent of the flag State, on the high seas, if
they have information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that the cargo of such vessels contains items
the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718
(2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution, for the purpose of ensuring strict implementation of those
provisions;
13. Calls upon all States to cooperate with inspections pursuant to paragraphs 11I and 12, and, if the flag State
does not consent to inspection on the high seas, decides that the flag State shall direct the vessel to proceed to
an appropriate and convenient port for the required inspection by the local authorities pursuant to paragraph 11;
14. Decides to authorize all Member States to, and that all Member States shall, seize and dispose of items
the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718
or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution that are identified in inspections pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 in
a manner that is not inconsistent with their obligations under applicable Security Council resolutions, including
resolution 1540 (2004), as well as any obligations of parties to the NPT, the Convention on the Prohibition of the
Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction of 29 April
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1997, and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological
(Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction of 10 April 1972, and decides further that all States
shall cooperate in such efforts;
15. Requires any Member State, when it undertakes an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13, or seizes
and disposes of cargo pursuant to paragraph 14, to submit promptly reports containing relevant details to the
Committee on the inspection, seizure and disposal;
16. Requires any Member State, when it does not receive the cooperation of a flag State pursuant to paragraph
12 or 13 to submit promptly to the Committee a report containing relevant details;
17. Decides that Member States shall prohibit the provision by their nationals or from their territory of bunkering
services, such as provision of fuel or supplies, or other servicing of vessels, to DPRK vessels if they have information
that provides reasonable grounds to believe they are carrying items the supply, sale, transfer, or export of which
is prohibited by paragraph 8 (a), 8 (b), or 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) or by paragraph 9 or 10 of this resolution,
unless provision of such services is necessary for humanitarian purposes or until such time as the cargo has been
inspected, and seized and disposed of if necessary, and underlines that this paragraph is not intended to affect
legal economic activities;
18. Calls upon Member States, in addition to implementing their obligations pursuant to paragraphs 8 (d) and
(e) of resolution 1718 (2006), to prevent the provision of financial services or the transfer to, through, or from
their territory, or to or by their nationals or entities organized under their laws (including branches abroad), or
persons or financial institutions in their territory, of any financial or other assets or resources that could contribute
to the DPRK' s nuclear-related, ballistic missile-related, or other weapons of mass destruction-related programs or
activities, including by freezing any financial or other assets or resources on their territories or that hereafter come
within their territories, or that are subject to their jurisdiction or that hereafter become subject to their jurisdiction,
that are associated with such programs or activities and applying enhanced monitoring to prevent all such transactions
in accordance with their national authorities and legislation;
19. Calls upon all Member States and international financial and credit institutions not to enter into new
commitments for grants, financial assistance, or concessional. loans to the DPRK, except for humanitarian and
developmental purposes directly addressing the needs of the civilian population, or the promotion of denuclearization,
and also calls upon States to exercise enhanced vigilance with a view to reducing current cominutments;
20. Calls upon all Member States not to provide public financial support for trade with the DPRK (including
the granting of export credits, guarantees or insurance to their nationals or entities involved in such trade) where
such financial support could contribute to the DPRK's nuclear-related or ballistic missile-related or other WMD-
related programs or activities;
21. Emphasizes that all Member States should comply with the provisions of paragraphs 8 (a) (iii) and 8 (d)
of resolution 1718 (2006) without prejudice to the activities of the diplomatic missions in the DPRK pursuant to
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations;
22. Calls upon all Member States to report to the Security Council within forty-five days of the adoption of
this resolution and thereafter upon request by the Committee on concrete measures they have taken in order to
implement effectively the provisions of paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) as well as paragraphs 9 and 10 of
this resolution, as well as financial measures set out in paragraphs 18, 19 and 20 of this resolution;
23. Decides that the measures set out at paragraphs 8 (a), 8 (b) and 8 (c) of resolution 1718 (2006) shall also
apply to the items listed in INFCIRC/2541Rev.9fPart la and TNFCIRC/254/Rev.7fPart 2a;
24. Decides to adjust the measures imposed by paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution,
including through the designation of entities, goods, and individuals, and directs the Committee to undertake its
tasks to this effect and to report to the Security Council within thirty days of adoption of this resolution, and
further decides that, if the Committee has not acted, then the Security Council will complete action to adjust the
measures within seven days of receiving that report;
25. Decides that the Committee shall intensify its efforts to promote the full implementation of resolution 1718
(2006), the statement of its President of 13 April 2009 (SIPRST/2009/7) and this resolution, through a work
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programme covering compliance, investigations, outreach, dialogue, assistance and cooperation, to be submitted
to the Council by 15 July 2009, and that it shall also receive and consider reports from Member States pursuant
to paragraphs 10, 15, 16 and 22 of this resolution;
26. Requests the Secretary-General to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Committee,
a group of up to seven experts ("Panel of Experts"), acting under the direction of the Committee to carry out
the following tasks: (a) assist the Committee in carrying out its mandate as specified in resolution 1718 (2006)
and the functions specified in paragraph 25 of this resolution; (b) gather, examine and analyze information from
States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties regarding the implementation of the measures
imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution, in particular incidents of non-compliance; (c) make
recommendations on actions the Council, or the Cormmittee or Member States, may consider to improve implementa-
tion of the measures imposed in resolution 1718 (2006) and in this resolution: and (d) provide an interim report
on its work to the Council no later than 90 days after adoption of this resolution, and a final report to the Council
no later than 30 days prior to termination of its mandate with its findings and recommendations;
27. Urges all States, relevant United Nations bodies and other interested parties, to cooperate fully with the
Committee and the Panel of Experts, in particular by supplying any information at their disposal on the implementa-
tion of the measures imposed by resolution 1718 (2006) and this resolution;
28. Calls upon all Member States to exercise vigilance and prevent specialized teaching or training of DPRK
nationals within their territories or by their nationals, of disciplines which could contribute to the DPRK's
proliferation sensitive nuclear activities and the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems;
29. Calls upon the DPRK to join the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty at the earliest date;
30. Supports peaceful dialogue, calls upon the DPRK to return immediately to the Six Party Talks without
precondition, and urges all the participants to intensify their efforts on the full and expeditious implementation
of the Joint Statement issued on 19 September 2005 and the joint documents of 13 February 2007 and 3 October
2007, by China, the DPRK, Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation and the United States, With a
view to achieving the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and to maintain peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula and in north-east Asia;
31. Expresses its commitment to a peaceful, diplomatic and political solution to the situation and welcomes
efforts by Council members as well as other Member States to facilitate a peaceful and comprehensive solution
through dialogue and to refrain from any actions that might aggravate tensions;
32. Affirms that it shall keep the DPRK' s actions under continuous review and that it shall be prepared to
review the appropriateness of the measures contained in paragraph 8 of resolution 1718 (2006) and relevant
paragraphs of this resolution, including the strengthening, modification, suspension or lifting of the measures, as
may be needed at that time in light of the DPRK' s compliance with relevant provisions of resolution 1718 (2006)
and this resolution;
33. Underlines that further decisions will be required, should additional measures be necessary;
34. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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